

of today, showing how White privileges were secured and assured.

One of the best aspects of the book is the way in which Menchaca utilizes her bio-ethnographic perspective to provide concrete observations on how racial legislation and racism have affected contemporary populations, providing the reader with first-hand sources of a kind often neglected by conventional anthropologists.

In conclusion, this is a solid piece of scholarship, and will fill a major void in a much-neglected area. Not only is it a fast and enjoyable read for undergraduates and academics, but it provides insightful analyses on several points seldom explored in Chicano/a studies, such as racialization over time, the Afro-mestizo roots of Mexican Americans, and the bio-ethnographic perspective. This pioneering book will enrich the fields of anthropology and Chicano studies.

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Anthropology & psychology

BARRETT, LOUISE, ROBIN DUNBAR & JOHN LYCETT. *Human evolutionary psychology*. xiv, 434 pp., figs., tables, bibliogr. London, New York: Palgrave, 2002. £17.99 (paper)

This is an enormously rich book, summarizing and explaining just about every recent controversy in this burgeoning field. As if anticipating anthropologists' misgivings about the whole enterprise, the authors begin by attacking the 'over-enthusiastic application of evolutionary theory to humans in a way that seems to leave no room for cultural influences'. Thanks to language, they stress, humans have been able 'to create and live in "virtual worlds" – worlds where intangible ideas and imaginary flights of fancy are as important and as meaningful as solid objects' (p. 2). Culture – as Kenan Malik observes – is not a mere encrustation upon human nature, like dirt on a soiled shirt. Without culturally transmitted patterns of behaviour and belief, human nature would lack any vehicle of expression.

The authors' stated aim is to bridge the gap between 'evolutionary psychology' (EP) and 'human behavioural ecology' (HBE). EP focuses on putatively innate cognitive mechanisms; HBE is much closer to anthropology, examining social and other behavioural strategies. While ostensibly even-handed, in practice the strongly HBE authors mount an effective demolition job on EP as promulgated in the United States. In the well-publicized metaphor of John Tooby and Leda Cosmides, the human mind is a 'Swiss army knife'. More specifically, it is 'a confederation of hundreds of thousands of functionally dedicated

computers' designed by natural selection during the remote Plio-Pleistocene. The linguist and philosopher Jerry Fodor – who first coined the term 'modular mind' – dismisses this whole idea as 'modularity gone mad'. Barrett and colleagues support Fodor in tearing it to shreds. If there is a dedicated, informationally encapsulated, hard-wired module for each aspect of human behaviour, how can any of us possibly decide between alternative courses of action? Which specialized module could conceivably do the deciding? Are the cues to trigger this or that 'module' weighted in some way? How do the postulated modules interact with one another and engage with the real world? 'So far', note the authors, 'Tooby and Cosmides have not provided the answers to these questions' (p. 273).

In a short review, it is impossible to do justice to the richness and thoroughness with which this and other debates have been covered. Human origins, hunter-gatherer food-sharing, genomic imprinting, problems of cheat-detection, parent-offspring conflict, child abuse, mate choice strategies, the demographic transition, evolution of the menopause, inheritance, warfare, mind-reading, language, laughter – these and other fascinating topics are discussed with transparent authority and abundant, up-to-date referencing throughout. I know of no volume remotely comparable in scope. As a textbook for undergraduate courses in evolutionary anthropology and psychology, it stands in a class of its own.

Academics are much like other people. We need our tribal loyalties, cementing these by starkly polarizing debate in terms of bloody combat between 'us' and 'them'. Barrett, Dunbar, and Lycett decline this temptation. Partisans of science – and in particular, of formal mathematical modelling so as to generate testable predictions – they also acknowledge companion methods and seek to give each camp its due, quoting accurately and seeking a synthesis wherever possible. With respect to the 'modularity' debate, for example, they conclude that 'mind' surely is 'modular' in some sense – but that human mental architecture was not fixed for all time among our prehistoric ancestors. Yes, within about nine minutes of birth, human infants respond positively to face-like stimuli. But no, this is not evidence for a fixed or permanent 'face-processing module'. Instead, stimulated by subsequent experience, a population of cells in each child will become progressively modularized for faces – or alternatively for bird-watching or spotting motor cars, as the case may be (pp. 279–80). In short, each of us acquires our uniquely modularized mind as a result of developmental processes, the outcome being intimately bound up with cultural transmission and learning (pp. 279–81).

The cover photograph of this excellent volume is captioned 'Pilgrims praying at the base of the 18-ft statue of Lord Bahubali'. This brings me to my only criticism. The relevance of the illustration escapes me. Prayer to supernatural

beings is the one topic surely *not* suitable for a cover illustration in this case. Religion is mentioned nowhere in the volume, not featuring even in the index. Pascal Boyer's psychological efforts in this area – such as his *Religion explained* (2001) – are completely overlooked, as are my own and all other evolutionary contributions to this field. Consistently with this extraordinary omission, the authors fail to discriminate between 'culture' (possessed by humans along with other species) and 'symbolic culture' (unique to humans). Over the years, I have become resigned to this apparent blind spot in the work of Dunbar and his colleagues, but it never ceases to amaze.

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MAGEO, JEANNETTE (ed.). *Power and the self*. xi, 221 pp., bibliogr. Cambridge: Univ. Press, 2002. £45.00 (cloth), £15.95 (paper)

Almost a decade ago I briefly reviewed an excellent book entitled *New directions in psychological anthropology* by Schwartz *et al.* (1992). The book suggested that the new approach would entail putting 'people in biology' and reaffirming the 'mindful body' (not that ordinary people outside academia had ever conceived of the person as a disembodied ego or the emotions as purely a social construct!), as well as making links with psychoanalysis and critiquing psychiatry – none of which were particularly new or original. I joked that the likes of Laing, Goffman, and Foucault had critiqued the 'medical model' of psychiatry some thirty years before and suggested that, rather than instituting a remarriage with psychoanalysis, psychological anthropology might be better served by building bridges with history and the social sciences generally. Interestingly, although Foucault was then all the rage in sociology and cultural studies, he was hardly mentioned in the whole book.

Engaging in what Roy D'Andrade has aptly described as 'agenda hopping', some members of the clan have now turned their attention to 'the neglected topic of power' – the ways in which power is experienced by individual people. The outcome is another interesting collection of essays from the psychological anthropology clan, edited by Jeannette Mageo. Like the earlier collection, the essays are lucid and engaging, theoretically informed, and grounded in either ethnographic research or personal experiences. In a highly laudatory preface, Gananath Obeyesekere describes the collection of papers as powerful, original, and inspiring. Phew!

In a useful introduction, Mageo and Knauff outline their project, the bringing-together of two 'rich traditions' – critical theory (Marxism) and psychological anthropology – to 'map' initially the 'space' between the intellectual hori-

zons of 'power' and the 'self'. Key figures who have allegedly attempted to bring the issues of power and the self together are briefly discussed: Gramsci, Marcuse, Foucault, Bakhtin, Bourdieu. But, of course, over the past fifty years or so many scholars have explored the relationship between power and the psychology of individuals, even though they may not have focused specifically on unique persons (self), and the following come to mind – Fromm, Reich (both of whom attempted to mediate the intellectual divide between Marxism and psychoanalysis long before Marcuse became interested in Freud), Laing, Wright Mills, Goffman, Bettelheim, Elias, Giddens, Taylor, and the Comaroffs. As one ought to make a clear distinction between cultural conceptions of the person (ideological, religious, legal, moral) – which my own book was all about – and the personhood and subjectivity of unique individual humans (self), studies of the relationship between 'power' and the 'self' (so understood) can only be biographical (or autobiographical), as indeed are many of the essays in this collection.

Foucault famously declared that 'the individual is the product of power'. According to his friend Deleuze, this was a profound insight. By the 'individual' Foucault meant either the ideological conception of the individual articulated in Cartesian metaphysics and early bourgeois political theory – the 'abstract' individual or epistemological 'subject' (individuated, monadic, asocial, detached), in which case Foucault was not saying anything new or original. (Indeed, bourgeois individualism had been lampooned by Marx and Bakunin in the middle of the nineteenth century and critiqued by social scientists for more than a century.) Or he (Foucault) meant the unique individual (self), in which case he seems to deny human agency. (As Strauss and Quinn have suggested, if you substitute 'culture' for 'power' in Foucault's writings, his statements sound very much like Benedict's classic culture-and-personality theory!) Mageo and Knauff in fact suggest that not only are Foucault's concepts of 'episteme' and 'resistance' rather ghostly entities, but that the subject rarely appears as an agent in his work. Marxists and sociologists have been critiquing Foucault on this issue for over a decade. It is, however, difficult to conceive how you could have resistance without agency. The trouble with Foucault, as with many of the contributors to the present collection (who tend to follow his path in their emphasis on 'epistemic power' to the neglect of economic and political structures), is that resistance and agency are never theorized adequately, and both are seen in a very individualistic fashion, even though, like power itself, they are intrinsically social. Thus there appears to be no mention in the essays of 'counter-hegemonic discourses' (noted in the introduction) or any sense that people resist power not only as the 'lone ranger', or the 'body', or through 'psychic power', or pathologically (by